Tuesday, March 31, 2015

SECTION 2-1106 Uniform Probate Code DISCLAIMER OF INTEREST IN PROPERTY.

SECTION 2-1106. DISCLAIMER OF INTEREST IN PROPERTY.
(a) In this section:
(1) “Future interest” means an interest that takes effect in possession or

enjoyment, if at all, later than the time of its creation.
(2) “Time of Distribution” means the time when a disclaimed interest would have

taken effect in possession or enjoyment.
(b) Except for a disclaimer governed by Section 2-1107 or 2-1108, the following rules

apply to a disclaimer of an interest in property:
(1) The disclaimer takes effect as of the time the instrument creating the interest

becomes irrevocable, or, if the interest arose under the law of intestate succession, as of the time of the intestate’s death.
(2) The disclaimed interest passes according to any provision in the instrument creating the interest providing for the disposition of the interest, should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed interests in general.
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(3) If the instrument does not contain a provision described in paragraph (2), the following rules apply:
(A) If the disclaimant is not an individual, the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant did not exist.
(B) If the disclaimant is an individual, except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs (C) and (D), the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died
immediately before the time of distribution.
(C) If by law or under the instrument, the descendants of the disclaimant

would share in the disclaimed interest by any method of representation had the disclaimant died before the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest passes only to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the time of distribution.
(D) If the disclaimed interest would pass to the disclaimant’s estate had the disclaimant died before the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest instead passes by representation to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the time of distribution. If no descendant of the disclaimant survives the time of distribution, the disclaimed interest passes to those persons, including the state but excluding the disclaimant, and in such shares as would succeed to the transferor’s intestate estate under the intestate succession law of the transferor’s domicile had the transferor died at the time of distribution. However, if the transferor’s surviving spouse is living but is remarried at the time of distribution, the transferor is deemed to have died unmarried at the time of distribution.
(4) Upon the disclaimer of a preceding interest, a future interest held by a person other than the disclaimant takes effect as if the disclaimant had died or ceased to exist immediately before the time of distribution, but a future interest held by the disclaimant is not
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accelerated in possession or enjoyment.
Comment
Subsection (a) defines two terms that are used only in Section 2-1106. The first, “future interest,” is used in Section 2-1106(b)(4) in connection with the acceleration rule.
The second defined term, “time of distribution” is used in determining to whom the disclaimed interest passes (see below). Possession or enjoyment is a term of art and means that time at which it is certain to whom the property belongs. It does not mean that the person actually has the property in hand. For example, the time of distribution of present interests created by will and all interests arising under the law of intestate succession is the death of the decedent. At that moment the heir or devisee is entitled to his or her devise or share, and it is irrelevant that time will pass before the will is admitted to probate and that actual receipt of the gift may not occur until the administration of the estate is complete. The time of distribution of present interests created by non-testamentary instruments generally depends on when the instrument becomes irrevocable. Because the recipient of a present interest is entitled to the property as soon as the gift is made, the time of distribution occurs when the creator of the interest can no longer take it back. The time of distribution of a future interest is the time when it comes into possession and the owner of the future interest becomes the owner of a present interest. For example, if B is the owner of the remainder interest in a trust which is to pay income to A for life, the time of distribution of B’s remainder is A’s death. At that time the trust terminated and B’s ownership of the remainder becomes outright ownership of the trust property.
Section 2-1106(b)(1) makes a disclaimer of an interest in property effective as of the time the instrument creating the interest becomes irrevocable or at the decedent’s death if the interest is created by intestate succession. A will and a revocable trust are irrevocable at the testator’s or settlor’s death. Inter vivos trusts may also be irrevocable at their creation or may become irrevocable before the settlor’s death. A beneficiary designation is also irrevocable at death, unless it is made irrevocable at an earlier time. This provision continues the provision of Uniform Acts on this subject, but with different wording. Previous Acts have stated that the disclaimer “relates back” to some time before the disclaimed interest was created. The relation back doctrine gives effect to the special nature of the disclaimer as a refusal to accept. Because the disclaimer “relates back,” the disclaimant is regarded as never having had an interest in the disclaimed property. A disclaimer by a devisee against whom there is an outstanding judgment will prevent the creditor from reaching the property the debtor would otherwise inherit.
This Act continues the effect of the relation back doctrine, not by using the specific words, but by directly stating what the relation back doctrine has been interpreted to mean. Sections 2-1102(3) and 2-1105(f) taken together define a disclaimer as a refusal to accept which is not a transfer or release, and subsection (b)(1) of this section makes the disclaimer effective as of the time the creator cannot revoke the interest. Nothing in the statute, however, prevents the legislatures or the courts from limiting the effect of the disclaimer as refusal doctrine in specific situations or generally. See the Comments to Section 2-1113 below.
Section 2-1106(b)(2) allows the creator of the instrument to control the disposition of the
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disclaimed interest by express provision in the instrument. The provision may apply to a particular interest. “I give to my cousin A the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and should he disclaim any part of this gift, I give the part disclaimed to my cousin B.” The provision may also apply to all disclaimed interests. A residuary clause beginning “I give my residuary estate, including all disclaimed interests to....” is such a provision.
Sections 2-1106(b)(3)(B), (C), and (D) apply if Section 2-1106(b)(2) does not and if the disclaimant is an individual. Because “disclaimant” is defined as the person to whom the disclaimed interest would have passed had the disclaimer not been made (Section 2-1102(1)), these paragraphs would apply to disclaimers by fiduciaries on behalf of individuals. The general rule is that the disclaimed interest passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the time of distribution defined in Section 2-1106(a)(2). The application of this general rule to present interests given to named individuals is illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1(a). T’s will devised “ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to my brother, B.” B disclaims the entire devise. B is deemed to have predeceased T, and, therefore B’s gift has lapsed. If the state’s antilapse statute applies, it will direct the passing of the disclaimed interest. Under Section 2-603(b)(1), for example, B’s descendants who survive T by 120 hours will take the devise by representation.
Example 1(b). T’s will devised “ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to my friend, F.” F disclaims the entire devise. F is deemed to predecease T and the gift has lapsed. Few antilapse statutes apply to devises to non-family members. Under Section 2-603(b), which saves from lapse only gifts made to certain relatives, the devise would lapse and pass through the residuary clause of the will.
Example 1(c). T’s will devised “ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to my brother, B, but if B does not survive me, to my children.” If B disclaims the devise, he will be deemed to have predeceased T and the alternative gift to T’s children will dispose of the devise.
Present interests are also given to the surviving members of a class or group of persons. Perhaps the most common example of this gift is a devise of the testator’s residuary estate “to my descendants who survive me by representation.” Under the system of distribution among multi-generational classes used in Section 2-709, division of the property to be distributed begins in the eldest generation in which there are living people. The following example illustrates a problem that can arise.
Example 2(a). T’s will devised “the residue of my estate to my descendants who survive me by representation.” T is survived by son S and daughter D. Son has two living children and D has one. S disclaims his interest. The disclaimed interest is one-half of the residuary estate, the interest S would have received had he not disclaimed. Section 2-1106(b)(3)(B) provides that the disclaimed interest passes as if S had predeceased T. If Section 2-1106(b)(3) stopped there, S’s children would take one-half of the disclaimed interest and D would take the other half under Section 2-709. S’s disclaimer should not have that effect, however, but should pass what he would have taken to his children. Section 2-1106(b)(3)(C) solves the problem. It provides that the entire disclaimed interest passes only to S’s descendants because they would share in the
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interest had S truly predeceased T.
This provision also solves a problem that exists when the disclaimant is the only representative of an older generation.
Example 2(b). Assume the same facts as Example 2(a), but D has predeceased T. T is survived, therefore, by S, S’s two children, and D’s child. S disclaims. Again, the disclaimed interest is one-half of the residuary estate and it passes as if S had predeceased T. Had S actually predeceased T, the three grandchildren of T would have shared equally in T’s residuary estate because they are all in the same generation. Were the three grandchildren to share equally in the disclaimed interest, S’s two children would each receive one-third of the one-half while D’s child would receive one-third of the one-half in addition to the one-half of the residuary estate received as the representative of his or her late parent. Section 2-1106(b)(3)(C) again applies to insure that S’s children receive one-half of the residue, exactly the interest S would have received but for the disclaimer.
The disclaimer of future interests created by will leads to a different problem. The effective date of the disclaimer of the future interest, the testator’s death, is earlier in time than the distribution date. This in turn leads to a possible anomaly illustrated by the following example.
Example 3. Father’s will creates a testamentary trust for Mother who is to receive all the income for life. At her death, the trust is to be distributed to Father and Mother’s surviving descendants by representation. Mother is survived by son S and daughter D. Son has two living children and D has one. Son decides that he would prefer his share of the trust to pass to his children and disclaims. The disclaimer must be made within nine months of Father’s death if it is to be a qualified disclaimer for tax purposes. Under prior Acts and former Section 2-801, the interest would have passed as if Son had predeceased Father. A problem could arise if at Mother’s death, one or more of S’s children living at that time were born after Father’s death. It would be possible to argue that had S predeceased Father the afterborn children would not exist and that D and S’s two children living at the time of Father’s death are entitled to all of the trust property.
The problem illustrated in Example 3 is solved by Section 2-1106(b)(3)(B). The disclaimed interest would have taken effect in possession or enjoyment, that is, Son would be entitled to receive one-half of the trust property, at Mother’s death. Under paragraph (3)(B) Son is deemed to have died immediately before Mother’s death even though under Section 2- 1106(b)(1) the disclaimer is effective as of Father’s death. There is no doubt, therefore, that S’s children living at the distribution date, whenever born, are entitled to the share of the trust property S would have received and, as Examples 2(a) and 2(b) show, they will take exactly what S would have received but for the disclaimer. Had S actually died before Mother, he would have received nothing at Mother’s death whether or not the disclaimer had been made. There is nothing to pass to S’s children and they take as representatives of S under the representational scheme in effect.
Future interests may or may not be conditioned on survivorship. The following
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examples illustrate disclaimers of future interests not expressly conditioned on survival.
Example 4(a). G’s revocable trust directs the trustee to pay “ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to the grantor’s brother, B” at the termination of the trust on G’s death. B disclaims the entire gift immediately after G’s death. B is deemed to have predeceased G because it is at G’s death that the interest given B will come into possession and enjoyment. Had B not disclaimed he would have received $10,000 at that time. The recipient of the disclaimed interest will be determined by the law that applies to gifts of future interests to persons who die before the interest comes into possession and enjoyment. Traditional analysis would regard the gift to B as a vested interest subject to divestment by G’s power to revoke the trust. So long as G has not revoked the gift, the interest would pass through B’s estate to B’s successors in interest. Yet If B’s successors in interest are selected by B’s will, the disclaimer cannot be a qualified disclaimer for tax purposes. This problem does not arise in a jurisdiction with Section 2-707(b), because the interest passes not through B’s estate but rather to B’s descendants who survive G by 120 hours by representation. Because the antilapse mechanism of Section 2-707 is not limited to gifts to relatives, a disclaimer by a friend rather than a brother would have the same result. For jurisdictions without Section 2-707, however, Section 2-1106(b)(3)(D) provides an equivalent solution: a disclaimed interest that would otherwise pass through B’s estate instead passes to B’s descendants who survive G by representation.
Example 4(b). G’s revocable trust directed that on his death the trust property is to be distributed to his three children, A, B, and C. A disclaims immediately after G’s death and is deemed to predecease the distribution date, which is G’s death. The traditional analysis applies exactly as it does in Example 4(a). The only condition on A’s gift would be G’s not revoking the trust. A is not explicitly required to survive G. (See First National Bank of Bar Harbor v. Anthony, 557 A.2d 957 (Me. 1989).) The interest would pass to A’s successors in interest. If those successors are selected by A’s will, the disclaimer cannot be a qualified disclaimer for tax purposes. Section 2-707(b) provides that A’s interest passes by representation to A’s descendants who survive G by 120 hours. For jurisdictions without Section 2-707, Section 2- 1106(b)(3)(D) reaches the same result.
Example 4(c). G conveys land “to A for life, remainder to B.” B disclaims immediately after the conveyance. Traditional analysis regards B’s remainder as vested; it is not contingent on surviving A. This classification is unaffected by whether or not the jurisdiction has adopted Section 2-707, because that section only applies to future interests in trust; it does not apply to future interests not in trust, such as the one in this example created directly in land. To the extent that B’s remainder is transmissible through B’s estate, B’s disclaimer cannot be a qualified disclaimer for tax purposes. Section 2-1106(b)(3)(D) resolves the problem: a disclaimed interest that would otherwise pass through B’s estate instead passes as if it were controlled by Sections 2- 707 and 2-711. Because Section 2-707 only applies to future interests in trust, jurisdictions enacting Section 2-1106 should enact Section 2-1106(b)(3)(D) whether or not they have enacted Section 2-707.
Section 2-1106(b)(3)(A) provides a rule for the passing of property interests disclaimed by persons other than individuals. Because Section 2-1108 applies to disclaimers by trustees of property that would otherwise pass to the trust, Section 2-1106(b)(3)(A) principally applies to
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disclaimers by corporations, partnerships, and the other entities listed in the definition of “person” in Section 2-1102(6). A charity, for example, might wish to disclaim property the acceptance of which would be incompatible with its purposes.
Section 2-1106(b)(4) continues the provision of prior Uniform Acts and former Section 2-801 on this subject providing for the acceleration of future interests on the making of the disclaimer, except that future interests in the disclaimant do not accelerate. The workings of Section 2-1106(b)(4) are illustrated by the following examples.
Example 5(a). Father’s will creates a testamentary trust to pay income to his son S for his life, and on his death to pay the remainder to S’s descendants then living, by representation. If S disclaims his life income interest in the trust, he will be deemed to have died immediately before Father’s death. The disclaimed interest, S’s income interest, came into possession and enjoyment at Father’s death as would any present interest created by will (see Examples 1(a), (b), and (c)), and, therefore, the time of distribution is Father’s death. If the income beneficiary of a testamentary trust does not survive the testator, the income interest is not created and the next interest in the trust takes effect. Since the next interest in Father’s trust is the remainder in S’s descendants, the trust property will pass to S’s descendants who survive Father by representation. It is immaterial under the statute that the actual situation at S’s death might be different with different descendants entitled to the remainder.
Example 5(b). Mother’s will creates a testamentary trust to pay the income to her daughter D until she reaches age 35 at which time the trust is to terminate and the trust property distributed in equal shares to D and her three siblings. D disclaims her income interest. The remainder interests in her three siblings accelerate and they each receive one-fourth of the trust property. D’s remainder interest does not accelerate, however, and she must wait until she is 35 to receive her fourth of the trust property.
2006 Technical Amendment. By technical amendment, subsection (b)(3)(D) was added to resolve the problem of future interests transmissible through the disclaimant’s estate. The Comment was correspondingly amended. For the prior version, see 8 U.L.A. 65-69 (Supp. 2005).
Legislative Note: Because Section 2-707 only applies to future interests in trust, and does not apply to legal future interests, states that have enacted Section 2-1106 should enact the 2006 technical amendments whether or not they have enacted Section 2-707. 

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