Challenger to Will must prove undue influence IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF KATHRYN PARKER BLAIR, DECEASED.

Challenger to Will must prove undue influence
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF KATHRYN PARKER BLAIR, DECEASED.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
A-5482-13T1.
Decided February 1, 2016.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Lori Ann Parker appeals an April 29, 2014 order that dismissed her verified complaint. In that complaint petitioner sought a declaration that a will executed by her aunt, Kathryn Parker Blair ("decedent"), and probated by the Surrogate Court be set aside because, among other reasons, decedent signed the will as the result of undue influence and also lacked the requisite testamentary capacity. Petitioner also appeals the June 24, 2014 order denying her motion for reconsideration. We affirm both orders.

On June 25, 1987, decedent executed a will that provided her estate would pass equally to her siblings but, if a sibling predeceased her, that sibling's share would pass to his or her surviving children. The petitioner's father was one of decedent's siblings. He died in 2002. On October 11, 2012, decedent executed a new will in which petitioner was not named as a beneficiary. Two days later, decedent, then eighty years of age, died of ovarian cancer.

The new will was probated on October 24, 2012. On July 17, 2013, petitioner filed a verified complaint seeking to have the executor, who is one of decedent's siblings, show cause why the probate of the new will should not be vacated. In the alternative, petitioner sought a declaration that, among other things, the probated will was the product of undue influence and decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute such will and, thus, the will should be set aside. The court denied the order to show cause, and discovery ensued on the remaining relief sought in the verified complaint.

Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have the court grant the remaining relief in her complaint. Petitioner failed to provide a copy of the notice of cross motion, but we discern from the record decedent's estate sought to have the complaint dismissed on the grounds the substantive claims asserted in the verified complaint were devoid of merit but that, in any event, the complaint was time-barred under Rule 4:85-1. The court heard both motions after the time for discovery expired.

The court denied petitioner's motion and granted the estate's cross motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint. In her motion petitioner had asserted decedent lacked the mental capacity to sign the will because at the time she was dying from cancer, in chronic pain, and on pain medication. The court found petitioner failed to set forth any evidence to support a claim of testamentary incapacity, see Matter of Will of Liebl, 260 N.J.Super. 519, 524-25 (App. Div. 1992), noting she failed to produce an expert's report to support the premise that either decedent's illness, the pain she was experiencing, or the effects of the pain medication affected decedent's cognition.

Moreover, the estate came forward with evidence decedent had the mental capacity to sign the will. One of decedent's close friends certified she visited decedent in the hospital on an almost daily basis after decedent was diagnosed with cancer in August 2012. The friend consistently found decedent — including the moment she signed the will — to be stable, strong willed, focused, and rational. Another close friend certified decedent was his "best friend;" in fact they spoke daily during their twelve-year friendship before decedent's death. He stated that long before her death, decedent told him of her intentions to disinherit some of her nieces and nephews. He characterized her as a highly intelligent, practical, strong-willed, focused, and "no-nonsense" person. In September 2012 he visited decedent daily and observed that, although enervated due to her illness, she still possessed the aforementioned characteristics. The court also noted that neither one of these friends stood to gain anything under the new will. Finding petitioner failed to present any competent evidence decedent lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will, the court dismissed this claim.

Petitioner also contended the executor under the 2012 will exerted undue influence over decedent and wrongfully induced her to sign the will. The court found no evidence in support of such contention. The executor had never been in a confidential relationship with decedent and there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, two elements that must be found to raise a presumption of undue influence. See In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275, 302-03 (2008). The petitioner's proof there was a confidential relationship between the executor and decedent was that the executor had signed documents pertaining to decedent's medical treatment. However, not only did such fact fail to establish the existence of a confidential relationship, but also the executor testified at his deposition that he only signed such documents after decedent had read them and requested that he sign them on her behalf, a point petitioner did not refute.

The court rejected petitioner's contention of undue influence, characterizing petitioner's claim as nothing more than "non-corroborated conjecture." Moreover, the only change under the new will that affected the executor was that he was appointed to this position. In addition, there was unrefuted evidence petitioner had scant contact with decedent in the years preceding her death; in fact, petitioner had not had any contact with decedent during the last six years of her life. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitioner's claim of undue influence from the complaint. Petitioner argued there were other deficiencies in the execution of the will, which included that the person who obtained the letters testamentary was an imposter and that there were grounds to remove the executor. The trial court rejected these remaining claims for the reasons set forth in a written opinion accompanying the April 29, 2014 order, which denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, granted the estate's cross motion for summary judgment, and affirmed the probate of the new will.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging, among other things, that the estate's cross motion for summary judgment merely sought to dismiss her complaint on the limited ground the complaint had not been timely filed pursuant to Rule 4:85-1 and was thus time-barred. The court denied that motion, finding the arguments raised in the estate's brief in support of its cross motion for summary judgment were not confined to whether the complaint was timely filed. The thrust of the estate's brief was not merely that summary judgment be denied but also that the entire complaint be dismissed because petitioner's substantive claims lacked merit. Further, during oral argument on the estate's cross motion for summary judgment, the estate argued reasons other than the timeliness of the filing of the complaint in support of its motion without objection by petitioner. Certainly nothing impaired petitioner from responding to each argument raised in the estate's brief in her reply to the cross motion.

On appeal, petitioner argues:

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONA. KATHRYN DID NOT HAVE LEGAL CAPACITYB. HARRY PARKER, THE EXECUTOR, ENGAGED IN UNDUE INFLUENCE1. HARRY PARKER WAS IN A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH KATHRYN2. KATHRYN WAS IN A WEAK, VULNERABLE, AND DEPENDENT STATE3. SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDED THE 2012 WILLPOINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REMOVING HARRY PARKER, SR. AS THE EXECUTORA. HARRY EDWARD PARKER, SR. IS NOT HARRY EDWARD PARK, JR.B. HARRY PARKER DID BREACH HIS FIDICIARY DUTYPOINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENTA. THE ONLY ISSUE THE DEFENDANTS RAISED WAS THE TIME-BAR ISSUEB. THE DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS UNTIMELY

When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard of review as the trial court. W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237-38 (2012). First, we determine whether the moving party has demonstrated there were no genuine disputes as to any material fact, and then we decide whether the court's application of the law was correct. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hillside Bottling Co., 387 N.J.Super. 224, 230-31 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 189 N.J. 104 (2006). In so doing, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). However, we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010), which we review de novo. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Kafil, 395 N.J.Super. 597 (App. Div. 2007).

Here, we find insufficient merit in the arguments petitioner raises to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R.2:11-3(e)(1)(E). After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm both orders under review substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Menelaos W. Toskos' written opinions dated April 29, 2014 and June 24, 2014.

Affirmed.

DOCKET NO. A-5673-09T4 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GERALDINE PARKS, Deceased.

DOCKET NO. A-5673-09T4

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GERALDINE PARKS, Deceased.

_______________________________________________

Submitted May 4, 2011 – Decided May 13, 2011

Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Sussex County, Docket No. P621-10.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISIONIn this appeal, Heather Fernandes, a beneficiary of her mother's estate, appeals an order that granted respondent Glenn A. Coleman -- a removed co-executor -- compensation for his performance as a co-executor and reimbursement of certain legal fees incurred. Because the trial judge failed to explain his rulings, we remand.

The limited record presented by these pro se litigants reveals that Geraldine Parks died on February 12, 2008. She had six children: Georgia, Heather, Russell, Patricia, Phillip, and

Glenn.1 Decedent's Will named two of them -- Glenn and Russell -- as co-executors. Difficulties with the administration of the estate surfaced, resulting in an application brought by Glenn for: the removal of both he and Russell as executors; the appointment of an attorney to act as administrator; and reimbursement for certain expenses he claimed to have incurred.

Heather, Russell, Georgia, Phillip, and Glenn's attorney appeared in court on December 7, 2009, the return date of the order to show cause. Although the moving and opposing papers were not included in the record on appeal, we assume from the transcript of the proceedings on that date that Glenn had moved to be discharged because of his own illness and the fact that he resides in North Carolina, circumstances that rendered difficult his ability to administer the estate; Russell's removal was sought on the claim that he had misappropriated or mismanaged estate property. The judge did not conduct an evidentiary hearing but instead permitted Heather, Russell, Georgia, and Phillip, all of whom were unrepresented, to express their positions. Russell opposed his own removal; Heather questioned the veracity of Glenn's contentions as to his performance in managing the estate and his alleged inability to continue in that role; Georgia expressed concern about Glenn's removal

1We refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

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before providing an accounting; and Phillip also argued Glenn should not be removed until he provided an accounting. Citing Glenn's "purported health condition and the fact that he's out of state," the judge concluded that he would "permit [Glenn] to resign as executor," but directed that he provide an informal accounting within sixty days. As for Russell, the judge concluded that he was "satisfied that there is a sufficient issue here warranting his removal as executor based upon the allegations of misappropriation here that have been referred to the prosecutor's office." The judge appointed an attorney to administer the estate.

The informal accounting was timely provided, and the matter back before the judge on February 9, 2010. At that time, the administrator appeared, as well as Heather, Georgia, and Phillip; Glenn appeared by telephone. At that time, Heather provided specifics as to why she believed Glenn's performance as co-executor was inadequate; the record on appeal does not contain any written exceptions that she filed nor does it reveal whether she even filed written exceptions. When the parties completed their arguments, the judge reserved decision.

On March 11, 2010, the judge entered an order that approved the informal accounting with the exception that he found Glenn was not entitled to reimbursement for legal fees expended in

3

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seeking to be relieved as co-executor but was permitted reimbursement of $525, which was paid to the attorney "in connection with the appointment of the Administrator following removal of the Executors." The judge attached to the order a

statement

of reasons, the entirety of which is as follows:

The co-executors were removed for cause and any commissions ordinarily payable to them are forfeited under N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-5. Equity dictates that the harm to other beneficiaries based upon time delay warrants a finding that a portion of the counsel fees sought as reimbursement by [Glenn] be forfeited. A portion, however, benefited the entire Estate and should be paid as an expense of administration.

The Administrator is entitled to legal fees under N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-6 and commissions under N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-4 and N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-16.

The order also contained a provision that reduced the proposed distribution to Russell by what he owed the estate; this provision declared that the balance of the distribution to Russell "shall be held until all outstanding matters are resolved."

Glenn later moved for reconsideration of that part of the March 11, 2010 order that limited the reimbursement of attorneys' fees expended in the initial application and that barred his recovery of a commission. He argued, among other things, that he had sought his own discharge as co-executor

4

A-5673-09T4

"[n]ot because he had done anything wrong, but because for medical reasons and personal reasons, he no longer wished to continue in his role" and that the judge must have mistakenly "lumped together" Glenn and Russell when he ruled on the informal accounting. In the colloquy between the judge and Glenn's attorney, the judge seemed to agree that he "may have juxtaposed" Glenn and Russell, and that he would have to "take a look at that" before ruling on the motion.

Heather opposed reconsideration, criticizing Glenn's performance as co-executor to the extent that would justify the terms of the judge's March 11, 2010 order. Heather also argued the motion was filed beyond the time frame set forth in Rule 4:49-2, to which the judge responded that he could "always correct a mistake" and that, after listening to the parties' arguments, he felt "about 99 percent sure I made a mistake when I entered this order the way I did." The judge, however, reserved decision in order "to go back over everything that was presented at that time and make sure that . . . this is what I intended."

On June 24, 2010, the judge entered an order that granted reconsideration and directed that Glenn be reimbursed $2620 in legal fees and $280.41 in costs, which were incurred when he sought to be relieved as co-executor. The order also permitted

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compensation to Glenn, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:18-13, in the amount of $2500. The record does not reveal that the judge provided any oral or written decision to explain the reasons for entry of this order.

Heather filed a timely appeal from the June 24, 2010 order. We glean from her pro se brief that she argues, among other things: that Glenn was removed as co-executor for cause; that the March 11, 2010 order was correct and appropriate; and that the motion for reconsideration was untimely, thereby depriving the judge of jurisdiction to enter the June 24, 2010 order. We cannot presently reach these issues on their merits because of the judge's failure to express the reasons for the June 24, 2010 order, pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a).

Litigants and appellate courts are entitled to a trial judge's rationale when reviewing his actions. See Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980); Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2006). For that reason alone, we remand this matter to the trial court. In addition, it is not clear to us whether the March 11, 2010 order was a final order; that question is critical to determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the June 24, 2010 order. If the March 11, 2010 order was final -- that is, if it disposed of all issues as to all parties -- then the motion for reconsideration

6

A-5673-09T4

was untimely because it was filed more than twenty days from service of the order in question. See R. 4:49-2. And, if the motion for reconsideration was untimely, the judge did not have jurisdiction to rule on it.2 If, however, the March 11, 2010 order was not a final order, then the judge was authorized to reconsider it at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment. See R. 4:42-2.

We, thus, remand for the judge's analysis of the circumstances relevant to whether the March 11, 2010 order was a final order. As observed earlier, that order directed that the distribution to Russell was to "be held until all outstanding matters are resolved." In this setting, and in light of the limited record on appeal, that direction may or may not suggest there were issues remaining to be resolved in this action. For example, because the record does not include the complaint or any responsive pleadings filed in this action, we cannot determine whether there were claims asserted in this action that relate to the judge's reference to "outstanding matters"; that phrase, however, could also be a reference to the additional work yet to be accomplished by the administrator with regard to

2The twenty-day time limit contained in Rule 4:49-2 may not be enlarged. See R. 1:3-4(c); Eastampton Ctr., LLC v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Eastampton, 354 N.J. Super. 171, 187 (App. Div. 2002).

7

A-5673-09T4

this estate. If the former, then it would seem the March 11, 2010 order was not a final order; if the latter, it may be. See Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 12-13 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd o.b., 205 N.J. 227 (2011). The judge should identify for us the circumstances relevant in determining whether the March 11, 2010 order is final.

The judge is also to provide a statement of reasons for granting the June 24, 2010 order as required by Rule 1:7-4(a).

Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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A-5673-09T4

DOCKET NO. A-5673-09T4 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GERALDINE PARKS, Deceased.

DOCKET NO. A-5673-09T4

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GERALDINE PARKS, Deceased.

_______________________________________________

Submitted May 4, 2011 – Decided May 13, 2011

Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Sussex County, Docket No. P621-10.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISIONIn this appeal, Heather Fernandes, a beneficiary of her mother's estate, appeals an order that granted respondent Glenn A. Coleman -- a removed co-executor -- compensation for his performance as a co-executor and reimbursement of certain legal fees incurred. Because the trial judge failed to explain his rulings, we remand.

The limited record presented by these pro se litigants reveals that Geraldine Parks died on February 12, 2008. She had six children: Georgia, Heather, Russell, Patricia, Phillip, and

Glenn.1 Decedent's Will named two of them -- Glenn and Russell -- as co-executors. Difficulties with the administration of the estate surfaced, resulting in an application brought by Glenn for: the removal of both he and Russell as executors; the appointment of an attorney to act as administrator; and reimbursement for certain expenses he claimed to have incurred.

Heather, Russell, Georgia, Phillip, and Glenn's attorney appeared in court on December 7, 2009, the return date of the order to show cause. Although the moving and opposing papers were not included in the record on appeal, we assume from the transcript of the proceedings on that date that Glenn had moved to be discharged because of his own illness and the fact that he resides in North Carolina, circumstances that rendered difficult his ability to administer the estate; Russell's removal was sought on the claim that he had misappropriated or mismanaged estate property. The judge did not conduct an evidentiary hearing but instead permitted Heather, Russell, Georgia, and Phillip, all of whom were unrepresented, to express their positions. Russell opposed his own removal; Heather questioned the veracity of Glenn's contentions as to his performance in managing the estate and his alleged inability to continue in that role; Georgia expressed concern about Glenn's removal

1We refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

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A-5673-09T4

before providing an accounting; and Phillip also argued Glenn should not be removed until he provided an accounting. Citing Glenn's "purported health condition and the fact that he's out of state," the judge concluded that he would "permit [Glenn] to resign as executor," but directed that he provide an informal accounting within sixty days. As for Russell, the judge concluded that he was "satisfied that there is a sufficient issue here warranting his removal as executor based upon the allegations of misappropriation here that have been referred to the prosecutor's office." The judge appointed an attorney to administer the estate.

The informal accounting was timely provided, and the matter back before the judge on February 9, 2010. At that time, the administrator appeared, as well as Heather, Georgia, and Phillip; Glenn appeared by telephone. At that time, Heather provided specifics as to why she believed Glenn's performance as co-executor was inadequate; the record on appeal does not contain any written exceptions that she filed nor does it reveal whether she even filed written exceptions. When the parties completed their arguments, the judge reserved decision.

On March 11, 2010, the judge entered an order that approved the informal accounting with the exception that he found Glenn was not entitled to reimbursement for legal fees expended in

3

A-5673-09T4

seeking to be relieved as co-executor but was permitted reimbursement of $525, which was paid to the attorney "in connection with the appointment of the Administrator following removal of the Executors." The judge attached to the order a

statement

of reasons, the entirety of which is as follows:

The co-executors were removed for cause and any commissions ordinarily payable to them are forfeited under N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-5. Equity dictates that the harm to other beneficiaries based upon time delay warrants a finding that a portion of the counsel fees sought as reimbursement by [Glenn] be forfeited. A portion, however, benefited the entire Estate and should be paid as an expense of administration.

The Administrator is entitled to legal fees under N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-6 and commissions under N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-4 and N.J.S.A. § 3B:18-16.

The order also contained a provision that reduced the proposed distribution to Russell by what he owed the estate; this provision declared that the balance of the distribution to Russell "shall be held until all outstanding matters are resolved."

Glenn later moved for reconsideration of that part of the March 11, 2010 order that limited the reimbursement of attorneys' fees expended in the initial application and that barred his recovery of a commission. He argued, among other things, that he had sought his own discharge as co-executor

4

A-5673-09T4

"[n]ot because he had done anything wrong, but because for medical reasons and personal reasons, he no longer wished to continue in his role" and that the judge must have mistakenly "lumped together" Glenn and Russell when he ruled on the informal accounting. In the colloquy between the judge and Glenn's attorney, the judge seemed to agree that he "may have juxtaposed" Glenn and Russell, and that he would have to "take a look at that" before ruling on the motion.

Heather opposed reconsideration, criticizing Glenn's performance as co-executor to the extent that would justify the terms of the judge's March 11, 2010 order. Heather also argued the motion was filed beyond the time frame set forth in Rule 4:49-2, to which the judge responded that he could "always correct a mistake" and that, after listening to the parties' arguments, he felt "about 99 percent sure I made a mistake when I entered this order the way I did." The judge, however, reserved decision in order "to go back over everything that was presented at that time and make sure that . . . this is what I intended."

On June 24, 2010, the judge entered an order that granted reconsideration and directed that Glenn be reimbursed $2620 in legal fees and $280.41 in costs, which were incurred when he sought to be relieved as co-executor. The order also permitted

5

A-5673-09T4

compensation to Glenn, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:18-13, in the amount of $2500. The record does not reveal that the judge provided any oral or written decision to explain the reasons for entry of this order.

Heather filed a timely appeal from the June 24, 2010 order. We glean from her pro se brief that she argues, among other things: that Glenn was removed as co-executor for cause; that the March 11, 2010 order was correct and appropriate; and that the motion for reconsideration was untimely, thereby depriving the judge of jurisdiction to enter the June 24, 2010 order. We cannot presently reach these issues on their merits because of the judge's failure to express the reasons for the June 24, 2010 order, pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a).

Litigants and appellate courts are entitled to a trial judge's rationale when reviewing his actions. See Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980); Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96 (App. Div. 2006). For that reason alone, we remand this matter to the trial court. In addition, it is not clear to us whether the March 11, 2010 order was a final order; that question is critical to determining whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the June 24, 2010 order. If the March 11, 2010 order was final -- that is, if it disposed of all issues as to all parties -- then the motion for reconsideration

6

A-5673-09T4

was untimely because it was filed more than twenty days from service of the order in question. See R. 4:49-2. And, if the motion for reconsideration was untimely, the judge did not have jurisdiction to rule on it.2 If, however, the March 11, 2010 order was not a final order, then the judge was authorized to reconsider it at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment. See R. 4:42-2.

We, thus, remand for the judge's analysis of the circumstances relevant to whether the March 11, 2010 order was a final order. As observed earlier, that order directed that the distribution to Russell was to "be held until all outstanding matters are resolved." In this setting, and in light of the limited record on appeal, that direction may or may not suggest there were issues remaining to be resolved in this action. For example, because the record does not include the complaint or any responsive pleadings filed in this action, we cannot determine whether there were claims asserted in this action that relate to the judge's reference to "outstanding matters"; that phrase, however, could also be a reference to the additional work yet to be accomplished by the administrator with regard to

2The twenty-day time limit contained in Rule 4:49-2 may not be enlarged. See R. 1:3-4(c); Eastampton Ctr., LLC v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Eastampton, 354 N.J. Super. 171, 187 (App. Div. 2002).

7

A-5673-09T4

this estate. If the former, then it would seem the March 11, 2010 order was not a final order; if the latter, it may be. See Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 12-13 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd o.b., 205 N.J. 227 (2011). The judge should identify for us the circumstances relevant in determining whether the March 11, 2010 order is final.

The judge is also to provide a statement of reasons for granting the June 24, 2010 order as required by Rule 1:7-4(a).

Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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