IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF KENNETH E. JAMESON, DECEASED.
___________________________________
Argued June 7, 2016 –
Decided August 12, 2016
Before Judges Yannotti, St. John, and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery
Division, Camden County, Docket No. CP-195-14.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs
Stacy Marie Wolin (Stacy), her daughters Erica Wolin and Jennifer Wolin, and
Stacy as guardian ad litem for her son Brett Wolin, appeal a December 16, 2014
Chancery Division order dismissing their Amended Verified Complaint (complaint)
with prejudice in accordance with Rule 4:6-2(e). We affirm.
I.
Because
plaintiffs appeal an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to Rule
4:6-2(e), we limit our summary of the facts to those alleged in the complaint,
which we accept as true for purposes of our analysis of plaintiffs' arguments.
Stacy is the sole surviving daughter of Yvonne Jameson (Yvonne), who died on
January 4, 2011, and Kenneth Jameson (Kenneth), who died on April 18, 2014.
Stacy's sister, Lisa, suffered from physical and learning disabilities and died
in 1966 at age eight.
Stacy enrolled in college in 1982
and began dating Marc Wolin (Marc), a person of the Jewish faith. After telling
her parents that she was dating Marc, Stacy's parents allegedly forbade her
from talking, socializing, and having any contact with him because he was
Jewish.
Stacy initially abided by her
parents' instructions, but then began dating Marc. Upon returning home after her
first semester at college, she advised her parents that she had resumed her
friendship with Marc. In response, Stacy's parents took her to a Y.M.C.A. in
Philadelphia and told her that she must stay there and get a job.
After a few days, Stacy asked for
permission to return home. Kenneth would not permit her to return because
Yvonne was opposed. Without Yvonne's knowledge, Kenneth arranged for Stacy to
stay at the home of family friends.
Stacy's parents eventually permitted
her to return home, but were not inclined to permit her to return to college. According
to the complaint, Yvonne told her that if she had known how many Jewish
students attended the college, she would not have permitted Stacy to attend in
the first instance. Her parents
permitted her to return to the college to go to class, the cafeteria, and the
library.
Toward the end of her second
semester, Stacy informed her parents that she was dating Marc. Her parents
refused to let her return home and said she was not welcome at their home. During the summer after her first year of
college, Stacy lived with her cousin.
At the conclusion of the summer,
Stacy returned to her college, but could not enroll because she did not have
sufficient funds. She applied for financial aid, but did not qualify because
her parents had the financial ability to pay, and the college did not accept
that Stacy had become independent of her parents.
Professors at the college assisted
Stacy in finding different jobs on the campus and contacted the financial aid
office to investigate the steps required for Stacy to obtain financial
assistance. During this time, Stacy's parents sometimes visited her at college,
but their attitude toward Stacy's relationship with Marc did not change. Plaintiffs
claim that during one visit, Kenneth "backhanded [her] hard enough to give
[her] a black eye" and on another occasion Kenneth "threatened to
physically harm Marc."
Ultimately,
Stacy returned to school, paying her own way through student loans and
financial aid, and graduated in 1987. Stacy did not return home during school
breaks, but instead often stayed at Marc's home, where she met his parents and
family.
On one occasion,
Kenneth allegedly confronted the rabbi at the temple where Marc's family
worshipped. Plaintiff's claim that Marc's
father went to the temple, where Kenneth told him that the "Wolins were
trying, among other things, to brainwash" Stacy.
In April 1987,
Stacy's parents executed separate Last Wills and Testaments.[1] Kenneth's will devised his entire
estate to his wife, Yvonne. In the event that Yvonne predeceased Kenneth, his
estate was to pass to Hospitaller Brothers of St. John of God Community
Services (Hospitaller), "to be used by them for the special education and
rehabilitation of the mentally and physically handicapped" at their
facilities in Southern New Jersey. If Hospitaller did not exist or offer
appropriate services at the time of Kenneth's death, his estate would pass to
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Camden, New Jersey for it to use "as nearly
as possible for the intentions expressed herein, that is, for the special
education and rehabilitation of the mentally and physically handicapped."
Article
Four of Kenneth's will stated that "[n]o part of [his] estate is at any
time to be gifted, bequeathed, or devised to [his] daughter," Stacy.
Article Four further stated as follows:
As an extremely loving and devoted parent, I found that the
love, care and concern which I lavished on my daughter was not acknowledged or
returned in any way by my daughter. Instead, she acted toward me with
selfishness, manipulation, cruelty, and with abusiveness. My daughter . . .
blatantly lied to and about me, acted with hatefulness and vindictiveness
towards me, and was abusive and physically violent towards me. [Stacy's]
shameful and hateful behavior towards me and her mother has brought me to my
carefully considered decision that [Stacy] is to receive absolutely nothing
from my estate.
Upon her
graduation from college in 1987, and following her parents' execution of their
respective wills, Stacy became close with Marc's family and observed many
Jewish holidays with them. A year after her graduation, Marc bought a home and
Stacy moved in with him. They married in 1990. Stacy attended a comprehensive
Judaism course prior to their marriage, but did not convert to Judaism. Stacy's
parents were invited to their wedding, but Kenneth allegedly told Marc that "they
would not attend the wedding because they would never endorse their daughter
marrying a Jew."
Stacy and Marc
have three children. She and Marc agreed their children would be raised in the "Jewish
Tradition." Kenneth refused to meet
his grandchildren and his will makes no mention of them.
Through the
time Stacy and Marc were married, her "parents' hostility was more
frequently evidenced by [her] mother, who appeared to suffer from emotional
difficulties as a result of the death of [Stacy's] sister, and . . . inability
to have more children." Yvonne
allegedly had a "powerful influence over" Kenneth, who "desired
to please" Yvonne and would do "whatever [Yvonne] instructed him to
do."[2]
Following
Kenneth's death in April 2014, his will was admitted into the Chancery Division,
Probate Part, and Stacy was provided with a copy of the will. Plaintiffs filed
a complaint against Kenneth's estate[3]
claiming in part that the statements contained in Article Four of Kenneth's
will are "totally incorrect and completely fabricated." Plaintiffs allege that Stacy was "disowned
solely because [she] was dating Marc, who happened to be Jewish" and that
Stacy was never "selfish, manipulative, cruel and abusive toward her
parents" and "never violent or hateful toward her father."
The complaint alleged that Kenneth's
will was invalid because it was the product of undue influence (count one) and
religious discrimination (count two), did not express a clear intent to
disinherit his grandchildren (count three), and was libelous as to Stacy (count
four).[4] In response to the complaint, Kenneth's
estate filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
4:6-2(e).
On December 16, 2014, the court
heard argument, granted the estate's motion for reasons set forth in an oral
opinion, and entered an order dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed.
II.
In our
consideration of a "trial court's decision to dismiss a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), we apply the same
standard but our review is de novo." Teamsters Local 97 v. State,
434 N.J. Super. 393, 413 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Frederick v. Smith, 416 N.J.
Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010), certif.
denied, 205 N.J. 317 (2011)). The
standard "requires an assumption that the allegations of the pleading are
true and affords the pleader all reasonable factual inferences." Seidenberg
v. Summit Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 249-50 (App. Div. 2002) (citing
Indep. Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85,
89 (1956)). The court must search the pleading "in depth and with
liberality to determine whether a cause of action can be gleaned even from an
obscure statement." Ibid. (citing Printing Mart-Morristown v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)).
To
avoid a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff is not required "to
prove the case but only to make allegations, which, if proven, would constitute
a valid cause of action." Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J.
Super. 100, 106 (App. Div.) (quoting Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J.
Super. 462, 472 (App. Div. 2001)), certif. denied, 185 N.J.
297 (2005). "However, a court must dismiss the plaintiff's complaint if it
has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief." Ibid.;
see also Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J.
Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011) ("A pleading should be dismissed if
it states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one.").
A.
Plaintiffs
first argue that the court erred by dismissing count one, which alleged that
Kenneth's will should be set aside because it was the product of Yvonne's "undue
influence." We disagree.
A
decedent's bequest may be overturned if it is proven to be the product of undue
influence. Haynes v. First Nat'l
State Bank of N.J., 87 N.J. 163, 175-76 (1981).
[U]ndue influence is a mental, moral, or physical exertion
of a kind and quality that destroys the free will of the testator by preventing
that person from following the dictates of his or her own mind as it relates to
the disposition of assets, generally by means of a will or inter vivos transfer
in lieu thereof.
[In re Estate of Stockdale, 196 N.J. 275,
302-03 (2008) (citing Haynes, supra,
87 N.J. at 176).]
"It denotes conduct that
causes the testator to accept the 'domination and influence of another' rather
than follow his or her own wishes." Id. at 303 (quoting Haynes,
supra, 87 N.J. at 176).
"Persuasion
or suggestions or the possession of influence and the opportunity to exert it,
will not suffice" to establish undue influence. In re Will &
Testament of Liebl, 260 N.J. Super. 519, 528 (App. Div. 1992)
(quoting In re Livingston's Will, 5 N.J. 65, 73 (1950)). The
influence must be such that it destroys the testator's free agency and causes
him to dispose of his property not by his own desires, but instead by the will
of another, which the testator is unable to overcome. Ibid.
Measured against
this standard, we are convinced the court correctly concluded that the
allegations in count one of the complaint do not set forth a cognizable claim
of undue influence. Plaintiffs allege that Kenneth was under the undue
influence of his wife Yvonne because he "would do whatever [Yvonne] wanted
him to do" and "desired to please her."
These allegations
are, however, insufficient to support a claim of undue influence. Plaintiffs do not allege that Yvonne's
requests destroyed Kenneth's ability to dispose of his property in accordance
with his own intentions or that his independent will was overcome. Stockdale,
supra, 196 N.J. at 302-03. In contrast, plaintiffs allege that
Kenneth had the express desire and intention to disinherit Stacy because of her
relationship with Marc. That allegation
is completely inconsistent with the claim of undue influence.
B.
Plaintiffs also
contend that the court erred in dismissing count two of the complaint, which
alleged that Kenneth's will must be set aside because it was motivated by his
rejection of Stacy's relationship with a man of the Jewish faith. Plaintiffs
argue that Kenneth's disinheritance of Stacy violates public policy; the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42; and N.J.S.A. 46:3-23.
It is well
established that absent undue influence, the motivation of the testator is not
relevant to the validity of a decision to disinherit a putative heir. See,
e.g., In re Blake's Will, 21 N.J. 50, 57 (1956) ("If
capacity, formal execution, and volition appear, the will of the most impious
man must stand, unless there is something not in the motives which led to the
disposition, but in the actual disposition, against good morals or against
public policy." (quoting Den d. Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N.J.L.
117, 153 (Sup. Ct. 1849))).
"A will may be contrary to the principles of justice
and humanity; its provisions may be shockingly unnatural and extremely unfair,"
however, courts are bound to uphold the validity of a will if made by a person
of sufficient age to be competent and if made while of sound and
unconstrained mind. "[A] will cannot be set aside on account of strong,
violent and unjust prejudice of the testator . . . if such prejudice be not
founded on delusions and does not show mental incapacity . . . [and] that the
unreasonableness of testator's prejudice and unfairness in the disposition of
his property will not alone avail the court to repudiate the will."
[Liebl, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 530
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).]
Even
if the disinheritance of Stacy was motivated by Kenneth's alleged rejection of
Stacy's relationship with a man of the Jewish faith, the court correctly
dismissed count two. Kenneth's alleged motivation for his disinheritance of
Stacy does not permit or require the setting aside of his will. Ibid.; In
re Petkos's Will, 54 N.J. Super. 118, 128 (App. Div. 1959); In re
Araneo's Will, 211 N.J. Super. 456, 461 (Law. Div. 1985), aff'd,
213 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J.
62 (1986). As we noted in Liebl, "[e]ven if decedent had totally
disinherited his [putative heir] due to an unreasonable discriminatory
prejudice," that is not "a ground to set aside the will." Liebl,
supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 531.
We also reject
plaintiffs' argument that Kenneth's disinheritance of Stacy, based upon his
alleged objection to her relationship with Marc, violates public policy. "The
power to dispose of one's property by testament . . . is a long recognized and
legislatively protected function having its roots in the 'sacred and inviolable
right' of 'absolute dominion' of every man over his own property, subject only
to compliance with law and non-interference with public policy." Metzdorf
v. Borough of Rumson, 67 N.J.
Super. 121, 126 (App. Div. 1961) (citations omitted). A violation of public policy, however, does
not result from a testator's motivation for his or her actions, but instead
occurs when the testator imposes a condition upon a bequest that violates
public policy. Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 129 N.J. Eq. 444, 454
(Ch. 1941); see also Liebl, supra, 260 N.J. Super.
at 529 (finding that the testator did not violate public policy where he did
not "place[] restrictions or conditions upon the legacy that are contrary
to public policy and thus invalid"); In re Blake's Will, supra,
21 N.J. at 57 (finding a will to be valid "unless there is
something, not in the motives which led to the disposition, but in the actual
disposition, against . . . public policy").
Here, count two of
the complaint alleges only that Kenneth's motivation for his disinheritance of
Stacy violated public policy. As noted,
Kenneth's alleged discriminatory motive does not provide a basis to set aside
the will. Moreover, the complaint does not allege that the will imposed any
conditions related to Stacy's disinheritance or upon the bequest to Hospitaller
that violate public policy. Thus, the
court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claim that Kenneth's will should be set
aside as violative of public policy.
We also reject
defendant's claim that Kenneth's will violates the NJLAD. The NJLAD reflects a
strong and clear public policy against religious and other forms of
discrimination. Rodriguez v. Raymours
Furniture Co., __ N.J. __, __ (2016) (slip op. at 15). It
prohibits discrimination in public housing, N.J.S.A. 10:5-9.1, and
places of public accommodation, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4; discriminatory
employment practices, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12; discrimination in the receipt of
public assistance, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.2; discrimination in land use and
housing, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.5; and other forms of discrimination.
The NJLAD, does
not, however, include a provision rendering it unlawful for a testator to
disinherit his or her child based upon an alleged discriminatory motive founded
upon religion or religious affiliation.
Thus, the NJLAD does not regulate the motive for Kenneth's testamentary
transfer and has no application here. Cf.
Howard Sav. Inst. v. Trs. of Amherst Coll., 61 N.J. Super. 119,
128-29 (Ch. Div. 1960) (finding no violation of the NJLAD or public policy in a
testamentary trust which selected student beneficiaries at a private
institution based on religion and national origin), aff'd, 34 N.J.
494 (1961).
Similarly,
defendant's contention that the will violates N.J.S.A. 46:3-23 is
without merit. The statute makes void "[a]ny promise, covenant or
restriction in a contract, mortgage, lease, deed or conveyance or in any other
agreement affecting real property" that restricts "the sale, grant,
gift, transfer, . . . [or] conveyance . . . of real property to or by any
person because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, marital status
or sex." N.J.S.A.
46:3-23. Kenneth's will is not a
contract or other agreement, and even if it was, it does not include any
restriction on the transfer of real property.
We are therefore convinced that the statute does not make void either
Kenneth's disinheritance of Stacy or the bequest of his estate to Hospitaller.
C.
Plaintiffs next
contend that the court erred in dismissing count three of the complaint
alleging libel by will based on its finding that our courts have never
recognized the cause of action.
Plaintiffs alleged that Article Four of the will was defamatory as to
Stacy, and that the defamatory statements were published by the estate
following Kenneth's death by admitting the will in the Surrogate's Court,
thereby causing damage to Stacy's reputation.
Plaintiffs
acknowledge there is no New Jersey case in which a cause of action for libel by
will has been recognized. They argue that we should recognize the cause of
action under the circumstances presented here. For the reasons that follow, it
is unnecessary for us to do so.
Libel occurs if a
defendant makes "[a] defamatory statement . . . that is false and 'injurious
to the reputation of another' or exposes another person to 'hatred, contempt or
ridicule' or subjects another to 'a loss of the good will and confidence' in
which he or she is held by others." Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale,
413 N.J. Super. 135, 168 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Romaine v.
Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 289 (1988)), aff'd in part, 206 N.J.
209 (2011).
A cause of action
for libel arises with the publication of the alleged libel. See N.J.S.A.
2A:14-3 ("Every action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced
within 1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander.");
Churchill v. State, 378 N.J. Super. 471, 478 (App. Div. 2005) ("[A]
plaintiff alleging defamation has a single cause of action, which arises at the
first publication of an alleged libel . . . ."). Plaintiffs do not allege
that Kenneth published any defamatory statements regarding Stacy during his
lifetime. Instead, they allege that the
libel occurred when the estate published the will following Kenneth's death by
admitting it to the Surrogate's Court.
Executors have a
duty to admit a will for probate. See In re Reisdorf, 80 N.J.
319, 324 (1979) ("[I]n offering the will for probate, he is but fulfilling
his duty as an executor."); Ellicott v. Chamberlin, 38 N.J. Eq.
604, 611 (E & A 1884) (stating it was the duty of the executor to "proceed
with the settlement of the estate"). Here, the executor admitted the will to
the Surrogate's Court on behalf of the estate in fulfillment of his legal duty
and obligation.
As a defense to
claims of libel, there is an absolute privilege for "any communication (1)
made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation;
and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." Hill
v. N.J. Dep't of Corr. Comm'r Fauver, 342 N.J. Super. 273, 295 (App.
Div. 2001) (quoting Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995)),
certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002). "The litigation
privilege is not limited to statements made in a courtroom during a trial; 'it
extends to all statements or communications in connection with the judicial
proceeding.'" Hawkins, supra, 141 N.J. at 216
(quoting Ruberton v. Gabage, 280 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 142 N.J. 451 (1995)). Statements made in
preparation for judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings are also privileged. Hill,
supra, 342 N.J. Super. at 294-95.
For libelous
statements to be covered by the litigation privilege, they must be relevant to
the proceedings in some way. Id. at 218-19. "Relevancy usually is
interpreted liberally so that the speaker does not act 'at his peril.'" Williams
v. Kenney, 379 N.J. Super. 118, 137 (App. Div.) (quoting DeVivo v.
Ascher, 228 N.J. Super. 453, 460-61 (App. Div. 1988), certif.
denied, 114 N.J. 482 (1989)), certif. denied, 185 N.J.
296 (2005). "[J]udges, attorneys, witnesses, parties and jurors are fully
protected against defamation actions based on utterances made in the course of
the judicial proceedings and having some relation thereto." Rainier's
Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 558 (1955). So long as
they have some relation to the judicial proceeding, "[a]n absolute
privilege may be extended to statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings even if the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any
justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party
defamed." DeVivo, supra, 228 N.J. Super. at 457.
Although
plaintiffs urge our recognition of the cause of action for libel by will, they
acknowledge that the litigation privilege, if applicable, bars the putative
cause of action alleged in count four of the complaint. They argue, however,
that the statements in the will should not be subject to the litigation
privilege and urge us to follow the decision of a New York trial court in Brown
v. Mack, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Under the
circumstances presented in Brown, the court recognized a cause of action
for libel by will against the decedent's estate. The court found that, while a testator's
reasons for disinheritance "are frequently important in a probate
proceeding," the estate cannot claim an absolute privilege for libelous
language and must instead defend against such a claim. Id. at 917.
We are not
persuaded the reasoning of Brown and decline to follow it because it is
inconsistent with New Jersey's well established absolute litigation
privilege. We find it unnecessary under
the circumstances presented here to determine if libel by will should be
recognized as a cause of action, and reject the reasoning of the court in Brown.
The estate here published the alleged defamatory statements when it admitted
the will into the Surrogate's Court. Thus, even if there was a cause of action
for libel by will, plaintiffs' claim would be barred by the absolute litigation
privilege.
The alleged
defamatory statements explain Kenneth's motivation for the disinheritance of
his only surviving child and were manifestly relevant to the proceeding before
the Surrogate's Court. They provide an explanation for his disinheritance of
Stacy wholly unrelated to Stacy's relationship with Marc. Thus, the statements
are relevant to the judicial proceedings because they are inconsistent with
Stacy's claim that the will should be set aside because of her relationship
with Marc.
Based upon the
allegations in the complaint and the content of Kenneth's will, we do not
discern any reason to reject application of the absolute litigation privilege
to plaintiffs' putative libel by will claim. See, e.g., Binder v.
Oregon Bank, 284 Ore. 89, 92-93, 585 P.2d 655, 656-57 (1978)
(affirming dismissal of a cause of action for libel by will because the alleged
defamatory statements were published in a judicial proceeding and were
therefore absolutely privileged). Based upon plaintiffs' allegations, we are
satisfied that the purported defamatory statements were published by the estate
during judicial proceedings, have significant relevance to those proceedings,
and therefore provide the estate with absolute immunity from a defamation claim,
including plaintiffs' putative claim for libel by will. Rainier's Dairies, supra, 19 N.J.
at 558. The court correctly dismissed
count three of the complaint.
D.
We also find no
merit to plaintiffs' assertion that the court erred by dismissing count four of
the complaint, which alleged that the will was unduly vague because Kenneth
knew he had grandchildren and he omitted reference to them in the will.
There is nothing
vague about Kenneth's will. It is unambiguous and unequivocal. It provides that
if Yvonne predeceased him, Stacy was not to receive any portion of his estate,
and the entirety of his estate was bequeathed to Hospitaller or, if Hospitaller
was no longer in existence, to an organization to be identified by the Diocese
of Camden that provides services to the mentally and physically handicapped.
There is no ambiguity in a will that disposes of the decedent's entire estate. See
In re Estate of Gabrellian, 372 N.J. Super. 432, 443 (App. Div.
2004) (finding no ambiguity where "[t]he probated Will indicates the
testator's intent that his wife receive his entire residuary estate").
Plaintiffs
characterize Kenneth's failure to mention Stacy's grandchildren as an omission,
implying that the grandchildren should take under the rules permitting portions
of an estate to pass to omitted children. N.J.S.A. 3B:5-16 allows "children
born or adopted after the execution of [a] will" to receive a share of the
estate. The definition of "child" "excludes any individual who
is only a stepchild, a resource family child, a grandchild or any more remote
descendant." N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1. By its express terms, the statutory
accommodation for omitted children does not apply to Kenneth's grandchildren
and there is no similar statutory accommodation for grandchildren.
The court
correctly concluded that the will is not ambiguous and its failure to make
reference to Stacy's children does not create an ambiguity requiring that the
will be set aside. We therefore discern no basis to reverse the court's
dismissal of count four.
|
Plaintiff's
remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
[1]
The will of Yvonne, who predeceased Kenneth by three years, mirrored the
testamentary language of Kenneth's will.
[2] We note that Stacy's marriage, attendance at
the Judaism course, agreement to raise her children in the Jewish tradition,
and increased hostility by her parents, and Kenneth's refusal to meet his
grandchildren, followed Kenneth's disinheritance of Stacy in his will.
[3] The initial paragraph of the complaint
reflects that plaintiffs' claims were asserted against Hospitaller, but it is
clear from the substance of the allegations that plaintiffs sought to set aside
Kenneth's will and to receive an award of damages from the estate. Counsel for
the estate and Hospitaller appeared before the trial court and participated in
this appeal.
[4] Count four also included a claim for
damages.
